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The article examines the role of the state in 
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term lending. Empirical findings suggest that it 
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Resumo
Este artigo examina o papel do Estado no setor 
bancário russo. Os dados estatísticos ilustram a 
participação dos bancos públicos e sua dinâmica 
de mercado nos últimos 25 anos.  Mostramos 
o impacto dos bancos públicos na concessão 
de empréstimos à empresas não financeiras e, 
particularmente, os empréstimos de longo prazo. 
Os resultados empíricos sugerem que os termos 
de rentabilidade e eficiência técnica dos bancos 
públicos não são necessariamente piores do que as 
instituições privadas. Finalmente, o autor compara 
a estrutura macro-nível e as instituições centrais dos 
sistemas bancários na China e na Rússia e sugere 
que estas são tipologicamente mais similares do que 
diferentes.  
Palavras-chave: Russia, bancos, governo, setor 
público, bancos estatais
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Introduction
The trajectory of the Russian baking industry over the past 25 years was far from linear: a meltdown of the public sector was then reversed, and the initial boom in 
the private sector was followed by its collapse and subsequent agony over 15 years or 
so. Distinctly from other transition economies in Europe, foreign banks do not control 
a sizeable share of the market and currently even see their market share shrinking. 
In this paper I intend to shed some light on the size and scope of the public sector 
in the Russian banking industry, with a focus on the heterogeneity within state-
controlled banks and the need to avoid excessive aggregation. Another motivation 
is to confront the trends in the market share of state banks with those in the loans-
to-assets ratio and the share of longer-term loans in the loan portfolio. The intuitive 
assumption is that these trends are correlated. I try to bring the activity of the Russian 
development bank into the scope for the first time, because previous research has 
completely missed the topic due to specific coverage by Russian banking statistics.
Contributing to the debate on bank ownership/performance nexus, I bring 
evidence from Russia to challenge the theoretical predictions about negative 
contribution of public banks to bank effectiveness and efficiency. Private financial 
intermediaries clearly failed to perform properly as providers of funding for economic 
growth and yielded way to public institutions that, counter-intuitively, display 
profitability and efficiency not inferior than their private peers.
In an attempt to place the Russian evidence into a broader socio-economic 
context, I refer a comparative study of the commercial banking systems in Russia and 
in China. The hypothesis is that China serves as an appropriate benchmark for Russia 
in this particular field, as the two banking industries turn out to be more alike than 
different in their essential institutions.
Correspondingly, the rest of this paper is organized as follows. The first section 
features the market share of public banks in the Russian banking industry. The second 
section describes the lending activity of banks depending on their ownership form. 
The third section assesses profitability and efficiency of state banks. The fourth section 
compares the main institutional features of the banking industry in China and Russia. 
The last section concludes.
The size of the public sector within the banking industry
Studying the impact of ownership type on bank performance requires an accurate 
identification of institutions pertaining each of the ownership forms, in this case public 
ownership. I use various sources to trace public funds in the equity of Russian banks, 
namely the websites of the banks themselves, Central Bank of Russia (CBR), Bankscope, 
Banker’s Almanac, etc. The sample includes banks where an identifiable public entity 
(-ies) owns a 50% or higher share directly or indirectly. In the Russian case, the type 
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of a public entity may vary from the federal government to industrial companies and 
banks whose equity contains public funds [Vernikov, 2012; 2015b]. The total number 
of state-controlled banks floats between 38 and 54 (currently 42), and I trust that the 
coverage is the broadest available.
Public sector went into decay in the 1990s and soon shrunk to nearly one-
third of total banking assets. The system of specialized state banks (‘spetsbanki’) 
was abandoned to looting by insiders and demolition [Schoors, 2003]. Soon after 
the financial crisis of 1998 the remaining public banks as well as new ones started 
regaining market positions, and after a period of incremental growth their market 
share approached 60% (Fig.1).
The gap between the CBR-reported market share of state-controlled banks and 
our estimate was quite broad at earlier stages of observations but shrank to a mere 
2.5 percentage points by January 1, 2015. I attribute the existence of such a gap to 
discrepancies in the coverage, the main one being the treatment of banks controlled 
by state-owned industrial enterprises: I have always included them, and the CBR 
apparently have not. The inclusion or non-inclusion of banks majority-owned by 
public banks and non-financial companies is a methodological, rather than a merely 
technical, issue. I opt to include them in order to reflect the true magnitude of the 
public sector in the Russian banking industry. However, the notion of state control 
might appear as far-fetched because I recognize that the government has limited 
capacity to control the activity of downstream entities in the corporate pyramids 
that public banks and companies have designed. The capital structure might be out 
of coherence with the governance structure in the sense that a predominant equity 
stake may not automatically give its holder control over the company, especially in 
Fig. 1 – Alternative estimates of the market share of state-controlled banks in Russia  
(as % of total banking assets by respective year-end)
Sources: CBR (2015); Raiffeisenbank (2015); same sources for respective years; own calculations; Vernikov (2015b)
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jurisdictions with less than perfect corporate governance. The whole purpose of 
replacing direct state ownership by indirect holding often is to withdraw the company 
from the external control and thus enable the appropriation by insiders. There have 
been multiple cases when nominally state-owned entities fall under the influence of 
insiders at the expense of shareholders. State control therefore remains a convention.
Russia’s state-controlled banks are too numerous, their business models too 
diverse, and their market share too large to be treated as a single group. This industry 
structure warrants for the introduction of additional sub-categories of state-controlled 
banks for the sake of a more accurate assessment of their activity and performance and 
a greater homogeneity within each of the groups. Similarly, when studying the Chinese 
banking sector, some scholars analyze the “Big 4” or “Big 5” state banks separately 
from all other banks [Berger, Hasan, Zhou, 2009] whose absolute majority are also 
controlled by the state. So do China’s official banking statistics [CBRC, 2014]. In Russia 
one can distinguish between the three “national champions” (Sberbank of Russia, VTB, 
and Russian Agricultural Bank) that jointly control 42% of all banking sector assets, and 
other state-controlled banks whose market share is in the order of 19%.  The difference 
between them is more essential than just average size of institutions. The three largest 
state banks often act as government agents and pursue a combination of financial 
and non-financial objectives [Vernikov, 2014a], whereas many of the smaller state-
controlled banks, particularly indirectly-owned banks, display market behavior similar 
to private domestic institutions. They are typically excused from on-lending of public 
funds to government-supported projects.
The nominal share of state ownership explains some, but not all developments 
in the banking sector. The government has many tools, apart from direct equity 
participation, to influence banks and companies, namely public procurement, 
liquidity allocation, access to national projects, and award of service contracts for 
public sector entities. Nominally private or foreign banks can be encouraged to act in 
concert with the government bodies or selected clans of civil servants. There are also 
opposite examples, of nominally state-owned banks that fall under the control of their 
managers and other insiders and change the operational regime.
The share of state banks varies depending on the market segment. As far as loans 
to non-financial private sector are concerned, the market share of state banks is 64.2% 
[CBR, 2015, p.21], i.e. slightly higher than in total assets. Russian official banking statistics 
covers only commercial banks and leaves beyond coverage an important market 
segment, namely development lending performed by the Bank for Development and 
Foreign Economic Activity (Vneshekonombank) that legally is beyond the banking 
system. The addition of the development loan portfolio of Vneshekonombank would 
increase the share of state banks in the loan market by more than 2 percentage points 
to (own calculation).
According to the Central Bank of Russia, state-controlled banks maintain 60.4% 
of all household deposits [CBR, 2015, p.19]. Despite low level of trust toward them, 
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domestic private banks still hold one-third of household deposits, to a large extent as a 
result of the deposit insurance scheme that erodes market discipline of the depositors 
and promotes moral hazard [Karas, Pyle, Schoors, 2013]. 
Productive lending vs. speculation
The predominantly private banking system that emerged in the 1990s failed to 
deliver on the main functions of financial intermediation: it neither provided financing 
to the productive sectors of the economy, nor enjoyed enough trust to accumulate 
private sector savings. The loans-to-assets ratio has declined to nearly 30% (Fig.2). 
Instead of loans, the banks were investing into government securities whose share in 
total assets reached 32.1% by the middle of 1998, i.e. right before the financial crisis 
[CBR, 2002, p.10]. Banks were effectively taking advantage of Russia’s fiscal weaknesses 
and clipping coupons instead of lending.
The loans-to-assets ratio recovered quickly after 1999, in parallel with the growing 
market share of state banks. It prompts the hypothesis that the activity of public banks 
contributes more to financial depth than that of other market participants, contrary 
to the negative predictions of [La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002]. The 
upward trend somewhat reversed after the financial turmoil in 2008-2009, reflecting 
the limited capacity and appetite to lend among banks across the board.
Researchers have long been studying the causality between bank activity and 
economic growth [King, Levine, 1993]. It has been proven empirically that bank 
activity is a good predictor of growth, but the causality there fails to receive convincing 
statistical proof in a variety of country cases. The reason may be that the gross volume 
Fig.2 – The loans-to-assets ratio of Russian banks
Source: Central Bank of Russia; own calculation (the share of state banks)
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of outstanding loans (and especially total bank assets) as a ratio of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) are overly aggregated measures of bank activity. Neither all kinds of 
banking operations nor all bank debt of the non-financial private sector are good 
for longer-term development and growth: bank loans can just as well support over-
investment, over-consumption and speculation [Bezemer, 2014]. Following Joseph 
Schumpeter’s ideas about the role of credit in financing productive innovations 
[Schumpeter, 1934], Bezemer proposes to distinguish between debts according to 
purpose and to focus on the volume of credit financing development. 
While banks are by far the most important type of financial intermediary in Russia 
and bank loans are the main external source of financing, the role of bank loans as 
a source of investment into fixed assets by non-financial companies remains quite 
limited. According to the Federal Statistical Service, this indicator at its lower peak in 
2000 read only 2.3% (Fig.3). It still remains under 10%.2
Building on the insightful recommendation of [Bezemer, 2014], I try to identify the 
part of bank lending that goes to finance investment and innovation, as opposed to 
working capital financing, speculation, etc. Vneshekonombank, the development bank, 
discloses the amount of its investment lending that makes up nearly 90% of the loan 
portfolio. Russian commercial banks do not report investment loans separately, so one 
can only assume indirectly which flows of credit go to finance a certain purpose. Data 
on the allocation of loans among sectors is only available on aggregated basis, while 
on individual bank level the breakdown by sector is usually too general, or inaccurate, 
or even distorted (e.g., the financing of a commercial development project presented 
Fig.3 – Domestic bank loans as a source of non-financial  
companies’ investment into fixed assets in Russia
Source: Rosstat (www.gks.ru)
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as a diversified corporate loan portfolio to several firms engaged in unrelated 
businesses, in order to circumvent the single obligor limit). I thus opt to use loans with 
maturities of more than 3 years as a proxy for investment lending, on the assumption 
that working capital financing usually implies tenors shorter than that. I admit that 
longer tenors might be a less than perfect proxy for investment lending because they 
can denote a variety of phenomena such as related lending to own or ‘pet’ businesses, 
poor loan quality, etc.
The share of longer-term loans in the total lending by Russian commercial banks to 
non-financial entities has gradually grown to almost 50% (Tab.1), partly reflecting the 
systemic reasons mentioned above. Vneshekonombank, whose mission is to promote 
development and investment, dedicates a much higher share of its loan portfolio to 
long-term lending, almost 98%. Currently Vneshekonombank contributes roughly one-
tenth of long-term loans, but its relevance keeps growing. 
Average numbers hide different performance by different types of banks. While 
longer-term loans prevail in the loan portfolio of state banks with an upward trend, the 
indicators for other bank groups lag behind or even decline (Fig.4). 
Table 1 – The significance of longer-term loans (over 3 years) and investment loans
* preliminary estimate 
Sources: Central Bank of Russia; Vneshekonombank
Commercial banks Vneshekonombank
2013 2014 2013 2014
Longer term loans / total loans 0.45 0.495 0.977 0.977
Longer term loans / GDP 0.15 0.205 0.019 0.019
Investment loans / total loans … … 0.916 …
Investment loans / GDP … … 0.013 0.017*
Fig. 4 – The share of longer term loans (over 3 years) in total loans to non-financial enterprises, %
Source: Central Bank of Russia; computations by Mikhail Mamonov
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The contribution of different bank groups to long-term lending also reveals 
interesting trends. The market share of the core state banks (State-1 in Fig.5) has 
remained between 60% and 70%, which was visibly out of line with these banks’ share 
of total assets and total loans in the earlier sub-period but became consistent with it 
by the end of observations. The contribution of the other state banks is small but tends 
to rise, and that of foreign banks is falling, in line with general tendency of disengaging 
from the Russian market.
Fig. 5 – The contribution of bank groups to longer-term (over 3 years) lending in Russia, %
Source: Central Bank of Russia; computations by Mikhail Mamonov
Researchers have noted recently that lending by state banks is counter-cyclical: 
during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, state banks reduced lending to a lesser extent 
than other banks in Russia [Fungáčová, Herrala, Weill, 2013] and in other emerging 
economies [Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt, Huizinga, 2015]. Our estimates suggest that this 
is particularly true for longer-term lending. Fig.4 and Fig.5 suggest that during the 
crisis the core state banks increased the most the share of longer-term loans, thus 
preempting the shortfall of such maturities in the loan market after the withdrawal of 
private domestic banks and foreign subsidiaries.  
The above-mentioned phenomenon reflects the role of public banks as 
government agents that carry out certain functions within the transmission 
mechanism of the monetary policy. In some cases these banks on-lend to second-
tier banks, industrial companies and the market at large the resources that monetary 
authorities make available to them for that purpose. It would however be far from 
truth that the entire loan portfolio of public banks consists of directed loans. Figuring 
out the precise proportion of directed loans at each bank is a non-trivial task in the 
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absence of a national credit register and the overly formal and superficial disclosure of 
the ownership structure.3
The efficiency of public banks
Mainstream economics argues that government ownership of banks in developing 
countries hinders financial development and reduces the average efficiency of the 
banking sector [La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2002]. Empirical literature on 
banking in transition in Central and Eastern Europe offers evidence of lower efficiency 
of state-owned banks in comparison to other market players [Bonin, Hasan, Wachtel, 
2005]. The perennial inefficiency of public banks served as a potent political instrument 
to promote privatization of those banks in favor of strategic foreign investors. One 
might assume that directed lending on behalf of the government should depress 
the efficiency of large state banks in Russia too; there is ample anecdotal evidence 
of inefficiency and fund abuse in public banks. Actual data from Russia, however, fail 
to deliver convincing statistical evidence of systematically lower efficiency of public 
banks. Tab.2 summarizes the return on assets and return on equity, the two main 
indicators of financial efficiency, at different categories of banks. The scores of the 
state-controlled banks are consistently above the average for the banking sector, and 
in most cases these banks actually lead in terms of profitability. 
 Category of bank
Return on assets Return on equity
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
State-controlleda 2.8 2.5 2.0 1.2 20.6 20.1 17.2 10.2
Foreign-controlled 2.4 2.5 2.2 1.6 17.4 18.8 15.1 11.1
Large private domestic 1.7 1.9 1.6 0.1 14.2 16.0 12.9 1.2
Small and medium-sized in Moscow 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.1 8.0 8.5 10.2 6.2
Small and medium-sized in other 
regions 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 10.4 10.7 10.2 9.6
All banks 2.4 2.3 1.9 0.9 17.6 18.2 15.2 7.9
Table 2 – The financial efficiency indicators of Russian banks, 2010-2014 (percent)
aCBR definition. 
Source: CBR, 2015; previous years’ editions
The indicators of financial efficiency do not suffice to gauge accurately the 
comparative efficiency because banks play on an uneven field. State banks have 
privileged access to cheaper public funds and household savings; they also enjoy 
greater market power due to their sheer size and the overwhelming market share in 
various segments of the banking market; foreign-controlled banks can take advantage 
of their parent group resources and brand strength. Therefore, profitability data must 
be complemented by the analysis of technical efficiency, i.e. the capacity of the firm 
to produce the maximum output from the minimum quantity of inputs. Mamonov 
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and Vernikov [2015] compute cost efficiency via stochastic frontier technique4 and 
then average individual bank-level cost efficiency levels (SFA scores) across all banks 
belonging to a particular group. While most of the papers on comparative bank 
efficiency in transition confront state-owned banks, private domestic banks and 
foreign banks, we distinguish between two sub-groups of public banks, namely 
the core state-controlled banks (State-1, comprising Sberbank, VTB, and Russian 
Agricultural Bank) and other state-controlled banks (State-2). This distinction helps 
controlling for the broad intra-group heterogeneity in terms of size, scope, business 
model, and governance. 
If we look at the average SFA scores throughout the period of observations (2005-
2013), then private domestic banks lead by the SFA score (81.1%), followed by State-2 
(78.2%), State-1 (75.5%) and foreign banks (60.3%) (Tab.3).
Bank group SFA score Standard 
deviation
Min Max Obs. No. of 
banks
% rank
All groups 80.1 - 14.1 2.1 99.8 29113 1139
State-1* 75.5 3 18.6 34.9 98.0 108 3
State-2** 78.2 2 15.2 20.8 98.7 1204 61
Foreign 60.3 4 19.9 6.9 97.9 1177 49
Private 81.1 1 13.1 2.1 99.8 26624 1065
*core state-controlled banks (Sberbank, VTB, Russian Agricultural Bank. ** other state-controlled banks.
Source: Mamonov, Vernikov, 2015
Table 3 – Group-level operating cost efficiency (SFA scores, production approach)  
as averages of 2005Q1–2013Q4
The different efficiency performance of bank groups, and in particular the groups 
State-1 and State-2, becomes evident when we add a dynamic scope to our analysis. 
In order to detect structural changes that the financial crisis of 2008-2009 may have 
produced, we split the observation period into three sub-periods: pre-crisis, during the 
crisis, and post-crisis (Fig.6). The graph shows that the ranking in terms of efficiency has 
changed several times in the process.
The spreads between groups of banks in terms of efficiency turn out to be narrower 
than hitherto believed, which is consistent with the hypothesis that all players within 
a banking system are exposed potentially to the best available technology. The 
ownership status (state-controlled or private) does not preclude a bank from adopting 
best practices. There is no permanent lead of a particular bank group, and three groups 
out of four compete for the best efficiency score over the period of observation. 
Most recently, the core state-controlled banks were more efficient than other state-
controlled banks and nearly as efficient as private domestic banks. 
Finally, Figure 6 suggests that bank efficiency rises during a crisis period, which 
means that economic crises discipline economic agents by forcing them to shed costs 
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accumulated during boom periods. We reckon that this empirical finding makes more 
sense than the results of empirical studies that suggested a falling cost efficiency 
during crises, which goes against factual evidence of cost cutting at the banks. 
Our findings effectively confirm the hypothesis of [Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010] 
that private ownership for banks in Russia is no guarantee of superior performance. 
Large state-controlled banks can also be cost efficient provided that they observe 
certain proportions in their capitalization, loans-to-assets ratios and some other bank-
level characteristics. It, however, contradicts the findings of [Berger, Hasan, Zhou, 2009] 
with regard to China’s Big-4 state banks, albeit on a more distant period. 
Fig. 6 – Technical efficiency scores of Russian bank groups (arithmetic averages of SFA scores  
within each group; ranging from 0 for the least efficient to 100 for the most efficient)
Source: Mamonov, Vernikov, 2015
Comparing the banking models in China and Russia
Compare the macro-level structure and the core institutions of the banking systems 
in China and Russia. The main hypothesis is that these two systems are typologically 
similar. We consider the main institutions, the market structure, the industrial policy 
of the government, and the banks’ involvement in the financing of the non-financial 
economy. Tab.4 summarizes our findings5. 
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Table 4 – The comparison of the banking systems of China and Russia






convergence (+),  
divergence (-), no 
change (=)
Institutional structure
 The number of commercial banks, and 541 ≈800 - +
the direction of its change   +
Geographical outreach: bank entities per: 
- 1,000 km2; 9.16 2.83 - +
- 100,000 adults 7.7 38.2 - +
Multi-tier and hierarchically organized system 
of commercial banks led by the core state-
controlled banks
Yes Yes + =
A bank-based model of financial intermediation Yes Yes + =
Financial depth (bank assets to GDP), % 131.6 45.6 - +
Market structure and concentration
Supremacy of large state banks Yes Yes + =
The market share of the: 
- core state banks, % 45 43 + -
other state-controlled banks, % ≈50 18 - +
domestic private banks, % 3 29 - =
foreign-controlled banks, % 2 10 - =
Concentration on the commercial banking 
market (Top-10), %
78 63 + =
The industrial policy of the government
Nurturing «national champions» within the 
public sector: 
- official industrial policy Yes No - =
- the actual policy of the government Yes Yes + =
The core state-controlled banks are at least as 
efficient as other market participants
Yes Yes + =
A genuine privatization of the core state-
controlled banks
No No - =
A more diversified equity structure of the core 
state-controlled banks (corporatization, external 
shareholders)
Yes Yes + =
Favorable treatment of foreign subsidiary banks Yes Yes + =
Favorable treatment of foreign bank branches Yes No - =
An explicit scheme of deposit insurance No* Yes - +
Bank involvement in the lending to the non-financial sector
Domestic bank lending is an important source 
of investment into fixed assets of non-financial 
companies
Yes No - =
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We find similarities as well as differences, however in dynamics the trend towards 
convergence prevails. The most visible difference is what seems to be opposite 
dynamics of the market share of state banks in China and Russia. A few largest state-
controlled institutions constitute the core of the banking sector in both countries. In 
Russia, the combined market share of Sberbank, VTB and Russian Agricultural Bank 
reached 43%. China’s 5 «large commercial banks» also keep growing, but their market 
share is on a gradual decline and already dropped to 53% of total commercial banking 
assets and 63% of employees (Fig.7). The linear trend lines on the chart might cross 
at some point near 50% of total assets and then converge. China’s falling share of the 
core state banks can produce an illusion of state withdrawal or divestment from the 
banking industry, but the absolute majority of joint stock, city and rural commercial 
banks were also set up by state agencies and enterprises and funded by public capital 
and remain closely related to the authorities [Okazaki, 2007]. Only five private banks 
have been authorized in China, of which four are operational (www.cbrc.gov.cn).
The share of the state budget as a source of funds for fixed assets investment is 
lower in China (4%-5%) than in Russia (20%). I suppose that state budget financing 
is replaced by lending from state banks that are controlled by government of China. 
In order to check this, I aggregate the flow of budget funds into fixed assets of non-
financial companies with the flow of loans disbursed by the core state-controlled 
banks (expressed through a change in the loan portfolio year-on-year). From 2000 
through 2013, the combined flow of funds from both sources averaged 9.4% percent 
* Envisaged. 
Sources: CBR, 2015; CBRC, 2014; World Bank, 2013; own research






convergence (+),  
divergence (-), no 
change (=)
Bank involvement in the lending to the non-financial sector
Lending by the core state-controlled banks 
complement budgetary funds invested into fixed 
assets of non-financial companies
Yes Yes + =
Government bodies interfere into the lending 
decisions of the core state-controlled banks
Yes Yes + =
The core state-controlled banks combine 
commercial banking with development banking
Yes Yes + =
Government bodies exert influence on the 
lending decisions of nominally independent 
banks
Yes No - =
Bank lending covers the budget deficit of the 
regional and local authorities






Table 4 (continued) – The comparison of the banking systems of China and Russia
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of annual GDP in China and just 4.8% in Russia. Budget funds and loans from state-
controlled banks do complement each other [Vernikov, 2015a].  
Trying to insert the developments in the commercial banking sector into a broader 
socio-economic context of China and Russia, I rely upon the theory of institutional 
matrices or TIM [Kirdina, 2014] according to which, the economies of China and Russia 
both feature a dominance of the institutional matrix that implies centralized non-
market re-distribution and superior conditional ownership (X-matrix). The leading role 
of the X-matrix is invariable («path dependence»), so any attempts of double-crossing 
are doomed, and earlier or later the proportion between cardinal and supplementary 
institutions will recover. The TIM pre-determines the specific form of resource 
allocation for the given type of society. The dominant form of resource allocation in 
an X-economy is centralization and subsequent redistribution under the guidance of 
the government. The complementary institution in this case rests in the decentralized 
raising of resources from the financial market and their allocation according to 
financial efficiency. Correspondingly, the state-controlled banks and their financing 
for government programs and projects appear as serving the dominant institution 
of resource allocation for the X-economy. Then privately owned banks’ activity in the 
accumulation of savings and their investment into financial market assets relates to 
the functioning of the Y-type institution. Together they ensure a needed proportion 
and balance in the financial system.
Fig. 7 – Market shares of the core state-controlled banks (% of commercial bank total assets) 
* Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Bank of Communications.  
** Sberbank of Russia, Bank VTB, and Russian Agricultural Bank, excluding subsidiaries thereof. 
Source: author’s calculation based upon data from: CBRC, 2014; The Banker, July 2014; CBR; RIA-Rating (http://riarating.ru/)
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Russia went much further than China in liberalizing its banking sector in the 
early 1990s. The government withdrew from the reallocation of credit resources and 
encouraged the breakup of the specialized state-owned banks. At its peak, the number 
of commercial banks in Russia exceeded 2,400, and absolute majority of them were 
private. The emerged system, however, was unsustainable and melted down during 
the crisis of 1998. Thereafter the natural (for Russia) proportion between public and 
private capital in banking started recovering. The state strengthened its relevance as 
a regulator, a systemic programmer and a producer of banking services in its capacity 
of controlling shareholder at the largest commercial banks and development lenders 
[Kirdina, Vernikov, 2013]. Unlike Russia, China is moving gradually but consistently 
from a total dominance of one type of institutions, those of centralized reallocation 
of financial resources, to a more balanced mix that includes resource allocation via 
market. Private capital remains underrepresented in the banking system, so its share is 
set to grow. Maintaining a proportion between different types of institutions preserves 
the stability of the financial system and the trust of the population and sustains 
economic growth.  
Conclusions
The Russian experiment with private financial intermediation mostly failed as the 
newly emerged banks indulged in reckless speculation instead of productive activity in 
the 1990s, which led to the collapse of 1998. Private banking institutions remain fragile 
and incapable of funding economic growth. The credit for the credit expansion in the 
2000s, and especially the longer-term productive lending for investment purposes, 
goes primarily to the state banks. In the household deposits market, private banks 
can compete with public banks thank to the deposit insurance system that offsets the 
general lack of trust towards private banks. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 fostered 
the restructuring of the banking industry along the lines of state-funded activity of 
public banks and greater government role in their lending decisions. The core state-
controlled banks carry out two heterogeneous types of activity at the same time, i.e. 
regular commercial banking and development banking or directed lending. Their 
role at the current stage increases in the context of re-industrialization and import 
substitution triggered by the adverse external challenges. 
Contrary to the predictions of the mainstream literature on government banking 
[La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2002] and banking in transition [Bonin, Hasan, 
Wachtel, 2005], Russian evidence fails to confirm a systematically inferior efficiency 
of public banks as compared to domestic private and especially foreign banks. This 
empirical finding may have policy implications, namely that the issue of privatization 
of the core public banks migrates from the field of economic rationality firmly into the 
domain of ideology.
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Andrei Vernikov
A comparison of the macro-level structure and the core institutions of the banking 
systems in China and Russia suggests that these are typologically more similar than 
different. That refers to the market structure, the industrial policy of the government, 
and the banks’ involvement in the financing of the non-financial economy. China is the 
appropriate benchmark for Russian banking sector, and not the banking industries of 
Central European countries fully controlled by foreign capital.
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